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Chapter 13: Its Operation, Its Statutory
Requirements as to Payment to and Classification of ·
Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages
by: David G. Epstein*
In 1973, Sidney Rutberg, then Financial Editor of Fairchild Publications, wrote:
Some bankruptcy experts think Chapter XIII is just plain dumb,
and in New York, where you find the most sophisticated bankruptcy
people, you see very few of XIIIs. Why beat your brains out to pay
off a lot of debts if you can get your debts expunged forever by getting a discharge in bankruptcy?
In certain areas of the country, notably in the South and parts of
New England, Chapter XIII is very popular. Part of this popularity
stems from the pride of individuals who want to pay off every cent
they owe and part is the result of local pressures. Threats of a
creditless existence for all eternity could turn a prospective bankrupt
into the loving arms of Chapter XIII.
Currently, filings of Chapter XIII petitions are running at about
30,000 a year and account for 15 percent of all bankruptcies filed. It
is a proceeding based on the Puritan ethic and highly regarded by
square America. If you like Lawrence Welk, you'll love Chapter
XIIl. 1

In 1980, some bankruptcy experts believe using anything other
than Chapter 13 is dumb 2 and a debtor will love Chapter 13, even if he
or she prefers the Village People or the Nitty Gritty Dirt Band to the
Champagne Music Makers.
This article will explore the operation of Chapter 13, the two major legal questions raised by the present Chapter 13, and the advantages
of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 and 11. 3
I.
A.

How

CHAPTER

13

OPERATES

Commencement Of The Case

Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 replaces Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Chapter XIII was limited to a
"wage earner," 4 ie., "an individual whose principal income is derived
* Dean, University of Arkansas School of Law. This article is based on a lecture presented
as the third annual Foulston-Siefkin Lecture on April 9, 1980.
I. S. RUTBERG, TEN CENTS ON THE DOLLAR 125-26 (1973).
2. See, e.g., DiPetro, Chapter 13-Unlucky Number For The Uninformed Lawyer, 53 CONN.
B.J. 176 (1979); Kaplan, Chapter 13 of The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Allractive Alternative, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 1045 (1979).
.
3. For a more complete consideration of Chapter· 13, see W. PHILLIPS, ADJUSTMENT OF
DEBTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL WITH A REGULAR INCOME (1979); Biery, JJebt Adjustment Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 473 (1979).
4. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 606(3) (repealed 1978, previously codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1006(3)).

2

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 20

from wages, salary or commissions." 5
Chapter 13 is open to more debtors. Subject to limited exceptions,
the source of income is not an eligibility test. Chapter 13 is available to
self-employed businessmen and women 6 and to welfare recipients. 7
Section 109(e) governs Chapter 13 eligibility. A debtor may file for
Chapter 13 relief if he or she:
I.
2.
3.
4.

is an individual, 8 and
has a "reRular income," 9 and
has fixed 0 unsecured debts of less than $100,000, and
has fixed secured debts of less than $350,000. 11

Chapter 13, like Chapter 7 and Chapter 11, commences proceedings with the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 12 Chapter 13 is different
from Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 since only the debtor may filed a Chapter 13 petition. There are no involuntary, creditor-initiated, Chapter 13
proceedings.
The filing of a Chapter 13 petition triggers the automatic stay of
section 362. 13 Section 362 enjoins all formal and informal creditor collection efforts directed at the debtor or the debtor's property. A Chapter 13 petition also stays collection activities directed against codebtors
of the individual who filed the petition.
B.

Codebtor Stay

Section 1301 restrains a creditor from attempting to collect a debt
from the codebtor of a Chapter 13 debtor.
The following hypothetical illustrates the application of a codebtor
stay under section 1301: J.R. borrows money from a financial institution to take a Dale Carnegie course. His mother, Miss Ellie, signs the
note as comaker. J.R. later incurs financial problems and files a Chap5. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 606(8) (repealed 1978, previously codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1006(8)).
6. Eg., In re Sutherland, 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1980); Jn re Eaton, I Bankr.
Rep. 433 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
7. Eg., In re Beaver, 2 Bankr. Rep. 337 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Iacovoni, I COLLIER BANKR.
CAs. 331 (D. Utah 1980).
.
8. The term "individual" is not statutorily defined. Section 101(30) defines a "person" as
including "individual, partnership, and corporation." 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (1978). This indicates
that neither a partnership nor a corporation is an "individual."
9. The phrase "individual with regular income" is defined in § 101(24) as an "individual
whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under
a plan under chapter 13 of this title, other than a stock broker or a commodity broker." 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(24) (1978). Does "a" plan refer to any Chapter 13 plan or the particular Chapter 13 proposed by this debtor? In re Terry, I COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 525 (W.D. Ark. 1980), takes the
position§ 101(24) merely requires the debtor have the ability to make payments under the plan he
or she proposes. Under Terry, if the debtor proposes a plan calling for minimal payments to
creditors, minimal regular income is required. Id. at 527.
10. The debt limitation does not include contingent, unliquidated debts.
11. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1978) (definition of secured claim).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1978).
13. See generally Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under The New Bankruptcy La>i; 12 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. I (1978).
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ter 13 petition. Section 362 stays the financing institution from attempting to collect from J.R.; section 1301 stays attempts to collect
from Miss Ellie.
Section 130l's stay of collection activities directed at codebtors is
applicable only if the debt is a consumer debt and the codebtor is not in
the credit business. This codebtor stay terminates automatically when
the case is closed, dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 or 11.
Section 130l(c) provides three grounds for relief from the codebtor
stay. It also requires notice and hearing·14 and requires the court to
grant relief if any of the three grounds are established.
First, the stay on collection from the codebtor will be lifted if the
codebtor, not the Chapter 13 debtor, received the consideration for the
claim. 15 For example, if in the above hypothetical, Miss Ellie, and not
J.R., filed for Chapter 13 relief, the financing institution could petition
for the relief under section 130l(c)(l) in an attempt to collect from J.R·.
Section 130l(c)(l) also covers the situation in which the Chapter 13
debtor is merely an accomodation endorser.
Second, when the Chapter 13 plan has been filed, a creditor may
obtain relief from the codebtor stay to the extent "the plan filed by the
debtor proposes not to pay such claim." 16 Assume, for example, that
J.R. still owes $200. J.R. proposes to pay each holder of an unsecured
claim 70 cents on the dollar. As soon as this plan is filed, the financing
institution can obtain relief from the codebtor stay to attempt to collect
$60 from Miss Ellie.
Third, section 130l(c)(3) requires the court to grant relief from the
codebtor stay to the extent "such creditor's interest would be irreparably harmed by such stay." 17 The running of a state statute of limitations is not a basis for relief under section 130l(c)(3). Section 108(c)
guarantees the creditor at least 30 days after termination of the stay to
file a state collection action against the codebtor.
C.

Trustees

A trustee will be appointed in every Chapter 13 case. 18 In many
districts, the bankruptcy judge appoints a standing trustee· who serves
as trustee in every Chapter 13 case. 19 In a number of pilot districts,
Chapter 13 trustees are appointed by the United States trustee. 20 In a
"United States trustee" district, the United States trustee appoints the
14. For a definition of "notice and hearing," see 11 U.S:C. § 102 (1978).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c)(I) (1978).
16. Id. at (c)(2).
17. Id. at (c)(3).
18. II U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1978).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1978).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (1978). Kansas is in such a district. Id.
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standing trustee. 21 In these districts, the United States trustee serves in
Chapter 13 cases if there is no standing trustee.
The trustee in Chapter 13 is an active trustee with all the avoidance powers of a bankruptcy trustee. 22 Section 1302 also imposes a
number of duties on the Chapter 13 trustee. Operation of the business
is not one of the enumerated duties. If a debtor engaged in business
files a Chapter 13 petition, section 1304(b) contemplates operation of
the business by the debtor, not by the trustee, "[u]nless the court orders
otherwise. " 23
What is the meaning of the quoted phrase? Does it empower the
court to appoint a trustee or does it merely allow the court to order the
end of business operations? Collier takes the position the court may
appoint a trustee to operate the Chapter 13 debtor's business. 24 This
reading of section 1304 is questionable. Section 1302, which details the
duties and powers of a Chapter 13 trustee, contains no language authorizing the trustee to operate the debtor's business. Moreover, section 1108 expressly authorizes the trustee to operate the debtor's
business in a proceeding under Chapter 11. There is no counterpart to
section 1108 in Chapter 13.
D.

Preparation Of The Chapter 13 Plan

Only a debtor may file a Chapter 13 plan. The court may dismiss
a Chapter 13 proceeding or convert it to Chapter 7 for "failure to file a
plan timely under section 1321 of this title." 25 The Act leaves to the
rules the question of the meaning of "timely"; that is, how many days
the debtor has to file such a plan.
The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules is currently working on new Bankruptcy Rules. Section 405(d) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides until these new Rules are promulgated, existing Bankruptcy
Rules apply "to the extent not inconsistent with the Amendments made
by this Act [the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978), or with this Act." 26
Rule 13-201 requires plans to be filed within ten days of filing the
Chapter 13 petition. 27
Sec!ion 1322 governs the contents of a Chapter 13 plan. Subsection (a) of section 1322 specifies what the plan must provide; subsection
(b) specifies what the plan may provide. A Chapter 13 plan must pro21. 11 U.S.C. § 151302 (1978).
22. For a general discussion of the avoidance powers of a bankruptcy trustee, see Aaron, The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Fu/1-Employment:for-Lawyers Bill, Part IV: Avoiding Powers
of the Trustee, 1980 UTAH. L. REV. 19.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1304(b) (1978).
24. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 1304.01, at 1304-4 (15th ed. 1979).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(3) (1978).
26. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
27. BANKR. PROC. R. 13-201, II U.S.C.A. (1977).
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vide for full cash payment of all claims entitled to priority under section 507 unless the holder of the claim otherwise agrees. For example,
most tax claims are entitled to priority under section 507. If D owes
$10,000 in 1979 taxes and files a Chapter 13 petition in 1980, she cannot
escape her tax liability. Her plan must provide for full payment of the
$10,000 tax claim. The plan may, however, provide for installment
payment of the $10,000 tax debt over the period of the Chapter 13 plan.
A Chapter 13 plan may provide for less than full payment to other
unsecured claims. The plan may pay some holders of unsecured claims
more than others. It may either treat all unsecured claims the same or
classify claims and provide for the same treatment of each unsecured
claim within a particular class. 28
A Chapter 13 plan may also modify the rights of most holders of
secured claims. It may alter the rights of Creditor A who has a security
interest on the Chapter 13 debtor's car or Creditor B who has a mortgage on the Chapter 13 debtor's store. It may not, however, modify the
rights of Creditor C who has a mortgage only on the Chapter 13
debtor's principal residence. 29
In the typical Chapter 13 proceeding, the source of the payments
proposed by the plan will be the debtor's wages. This is not, however, a
statutory requirement. Section 1322(a)(l) only requires the plan provide for submission of "such portion of future earnings . . . of the
debtor· to the supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for
the exc;:cution of the plan." Payments under the plan may also be
funded by sale of "property of the estate or property of the debtor." 30
Section 1322(c) limits the payment period under a Chapter 13 plan
to three years, but payment periods as long as five years are permitted
with court approval.

E.

Confirmation Of The Chapter 13 Plan

In Chapter 13, creditors do not vote on the plan. Chapter 13 requires only court approval. The standards for judicial confirmation of
a Chapter 13 plan are set out in section 1325.
Section 1325(a)(l) requires the plan satisfy Chapter 13 provisions
and other applicable bankruptcy law requirements. Section l325(a)(2)
conditions confirmation on payment of the $60 filing fee. Section
1325(a)(3) sets out a "good faith" standard. Section 1325(a)(4) protects
28. Questions concerning the statutorily required amounts to be paid holders of general
claims and the classification of claims will be treated in Part II.
29. What if Chas additional security for its claim? Under§ 506, the right of setolf is equated
with a secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1978). It would thus seem if D obtained his ho.use mortgage from C Savings and Loan and D maintains a savings account at C Savings and Loan,
§ 1322(b)(2) would not protect C Savings and Loan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) ( 1978).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8) (1978).
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the holders of unsecured claims by imposing a "best interests of creditors" test: the present value of the proposed payments to a holder of an
unsecured claim must at least equal the amount the creditor would
have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
The following hypothetical situation illustrates the practical significance of the "present value" language in section 1325(a)(4). Assume
Debtor owes $10,000 and files a Chapter 13 petition. Had Debtor filed
a Chapter 7 petition, the sale of the property of the estate would have
yielded a sufficient sum to pay all priority creditors in full and pay
general creditors 36 cents on the dollar. Debtor's Chapter 13 petition
proposes to pay general creditors $100 a month for 36 months. This
plan does not satisfy the requirement of section 1325(a)(4). Payment of
$3,600 over a thirty-six month period does not have a "present value"
of $3,600.
Section 1325(a)(5) protects the holders of secured claims "provided for by the plan" by requiring one of the following:
(A) Acceptance of the plan by such a creditor; or
(B) Continuation of the lien and proposed payments to such a creditor of a present value at least equal to the value of the collateral; or
(C) Surrender of the collateral to the creditor.

The following hypothetical situtation illustrates the application of
section 1325(a)(5). Assume Eddie Haskell owes Chaste Manhattan
Bank $4,000 and the bank has a security interest in Haskell's 1978
Chrysler. Haskell files for relief under Chapter 13. If the bank is not
willing to accept Haskell's Chapter 13 plan, it will be necessary to appraise Haskell's car. The payments to the bank under the plan must
have a present value at least equal to the value of Haskell's car. Accordingly, if Haskell's car is valued at only $1,800, the present value of
the payments to the bank must be at least $1,800. (Under these facts,
the bank would also have an unsecured claim for $2,200).
Section 1325(a)(6) requires a determination of ability to perform;
the debtor must "be able to make all payments under the plan and to
comply with the plan." 31
A confirmed Chapter 13 plan is binding on the debtor and all of
his creditors.32 Unless the plan or the order confirming the plan otherwise provides, the plan vests all of the "property of the estate" in the
debtor free and clear of "any claim or interest of any creditor provided
for by the plan." 33 On confirmation, the plan is put into effect with the
debtor generally making the payments provided in the plan to a Chapter 13 trustee who acts as a disbursing agent.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1978).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (1978).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(c) (1978).
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Discharge

Under section l328(a) the debtor receives a discharge after completion of payments provided in Chapter 13. A section 1328(a) discharge is not subject to all the exceptions in section 523. The only debts
excepted from a section 1328(a) discharge are:
( l) Allowed claims not provided by the plan,
(2) Certain long-term obligations specifically provided for by the
plan, 34 and
(3) Claims for alimony and child support.
The bankruptcy court may grant a discharge in a Chapter 13 case
even though the debtor has not completed payments required by the
plan. Section l328(b) empowers the bankruptcy court to grant a "hardship" discharge if:
(l) The debtor's failure to complete the plan was due to circumstances for which he or she "should not justly be held accountable";35 and
(2) The value of the payments made under the plan to each creditor
at least e~uals what the creditor would have received under
Chapter 7; 6 and
(3) Modification of the plan is not "practicable." 37
A section l328(b) "hardship" discharge is not as comprehensive as
a section l328(a) discharge. A "hardship" discharge is limited by all
the section 523(a) exceptions to discharge and only relieves the debtor
from personal liability on unsecured claims. 38
If a debtor receives a discharge under either section 1328(a) or section l328(b), he or she may not receive a discharge in a Chapter 7 case
filed within six years after the date the Chapter 13 case was filed unless
payments under the Chapter 13 plan totalled at least 70% of the allowed unsecured claims and the plan was the "debtor's best effort." 39
A discharge under section l328(a) or.section l328(b) does not affect the
debtor's right to future Chapter 13 relief.
G.

Dismissal And Conversion

A debtor who files a Chapter 13 petition may change his or her
mind. At any time the debtor may request the bankruptcy court to
34. A Chapter 13 plan may not provide for a payment period of more than five years. 11
U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1978). Most Chapter 13 plans propose payment periods of three years or less.
Some of the debtor's debts may have a longer payment period. Assume D buys a new car on
January IO, 1980. She obtains financing from a bank; the note provides for payments of $100 a
month for 60 months. On March 30, 1981, D files for Chapter 13 relief. Her plan provides for
payments to Bank of$100 a month for the 36 months of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). On
completion of the plan, D's obligation to the bank for the remaining payments is excepted from
discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(l).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(l) (1978).
36. Id. at (b)(2).
37. Id. at (b)(3).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c) (1978).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9) (1978).
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dismiss the case or convert it to a Chapter 7 case. 40
The bankruptcy court may also dismiss a Chapter 13 case or convert it to a case under Chapter 7 on request of a creditor. The statutory
standard for such creditor-requested conversion or dismissal is "for
cause." Section 1307(c) provides seven examples of "cause."41
Under section 1307(d) a bankruptcy court may convert from
Chapter 13 to Chapter 11 before confirmation of the plan on request of
a party in interest and after notice and hearing. Section 1307(e) protects farmers from creditor-requested conversions from Chapter 13 to
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.
II.
A.

LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY CHAPTER

13

Amount Of Payments To Holders Of General Claims

In proceedings under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
the. question of how much the debtor was legally obligated to pay his or
her.general creditors rarely arose. Almost all plans filed under Chapter
XIII provided full payment of all filed and allowed general claims. 42
One possible reason for the popularity of extension plans in Chapter XIII is the creditor approval requirement: section 652 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 requires approval of the Chapter XIII plan by a
majority in number and amount of the general creditors who have
claims proved and allowed. Some creditors would not approve a plan
providing less than full payment. 43 '
The availability of future bankruptcy relief was another factor influencing debtors to file Chapter XIII extension plans. A debtor who
made all payments under a Chapter XIII extension plan and received a
section 660 discharge was not barred from further bankruptcy relief. 44
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1307 (1978).
41. "Cause," within the meaning of§ 1307(c), includes the following:
(I) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under chapter 123 of title 28;
(3) failure to file a plan timely under section 1321 of this title;
(4) denial of confirmation of a plan under section 1325 of this title and denial of
additional time for filing another plan or a modification of a plan;
(5) material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a confirmed plan;
(6) revocation of the order of confirmation under section 1330 of this title, and
denial of confirmation of a modified plan under section 1329 of this title; and
(7) termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition
specified in the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(l)-(7) (1978).
42. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, PART
I, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1973).
43. The Commission's Report minimizes the impact of the requirement of creditor acceptance. "Chapter XII~ . . . requires a plan to have been accepted by a majority in number and
amount of all the creditors whose claims have been proved and allowed before the conclusion of
the meeting of creditors held under the Chapter. The Commission is informed that it is unusual
for more than a few creditors to qualify to vote by filing claims." Id. at 174.
44. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966). See generally Countryman, Chapter
XIII Wage Earner's Plans: Past, Present and Future, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 275, 279-84 (1969).
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In the event further financial difficulties were encountered, the debtor
could file for straight bankruptcy or Chapter XIII relief and receive a
discharge. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a debtor who received a
section 660 discharge after completing payments under a composition
plan was precluded from receiving another bankruptcy discharge for
six years. 45
Chapter 13 of the new Bankruptcy Code does not present the same
obstacles to composition plans. There is no statutory requirement of
creditor approval of Chapter 13 plans. Also, the impact of a discharge
in a Chapter 13 composition proceeding on the availability of future
bankruptcy relief has been reduced significantly. Under the new Bankruptcy Code, a debtor can file for relief under Chapter 13, propose a
composition plan, complete the plan, receive a section 1328(a) discharge and be immediately eligible for another Chapter 13 discharge. 46
There has been a number of reported cases involving Chapter 13
composition plans raising the question of how much a Chapter 13
debtor is legally obligated to pay his or her creditors. Section
1325(a)(4) requires the present value of the plan's proposed payment to
general claim holders at least equal the amount to be paid on such
claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of this
title on such date. This statutory provision seemingly requires two separate calculations. First, the present value of the proposed payments
must be calculated. As noted earlier, the present value of monthly payments of $100 for 36 months is obviously less than $3,600. (The exact
present value of such payments is less obvious). Second, the amount
the holder of the general claim would receive in a Chapter 7 proceeding is calculated. In Chapter 7, the net proceeds from liquidation of the
"property of the estate" is distributed to holders of general claims.
Such claimants do not, however, receive the net proceeds from the sale
of all of the "property of the estate" because:
I. some "property of the estate" will be turned over to the debtor
as "exempt property" under section 522;47
II. some property of the estate will be transferred to third parties
protected by section 548 after filing the Chapter 7 petition; 48
Ill. some property of the estate will be subject to liens valid in
bankruptcy. Under section 724, encumbered property or the proceeds
thereof must be first used to satisfy the holders of secured claims;
45. Countryman, supra note 44, at 279.
46. Arguably, a bankruptcy coun could consider the debtor's bankruptcy history in deciding
whether to dismiss the Chapter 13 proceeding under§ 305 or confirm a plan under§ 1323(a)(3).
47. See generally Hughes, Code Exemptions: Far-Reaching Achievement, 28 DE PAUL L.
REV. 1025 (1979).
48. See generally D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 227-32 (2d ed. 1980).
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IV. some property of the estate must be used to satisfy claims
entitled to a priority under section 507.
As a result of sections 522, 548, 724 and 507, many situations exist
in which the holders general claims would receive nothing in Chapter
7. 49 In such situations a Chapter 13 plan providing for no payment or
nominal payment to holders of general claims would seem to meet.the
requirements of section 1325(a)(4). A number of reported cases so
hold. 50
However, many of these cases also hold a Chapter 13 plan providing only nominal payment to holders of general claims does not meet
the requirement of section 1325(a)(3). Section l325(a)(3) provides "the
plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden
by law." 51
The phrase "good faith" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code
nor discussed in the legislative history accompanying the Code. Section 656 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contains a similar requirement;52 however, no reported cases construe the requirement of "good
faith" under section 656. There is case law construing the requirement
of good faith in section 1325(a)(3).
In re Keckler 53 found the good faith requirement of section
l 325(a)(3) satisfied even though the debtor proposed to pay her general
creditors only 5% and used Chapter 13 to escape personal liability on a
debt excepted from discharge in a Chapter 7 proceeding. Ms. Keckler
had no nonexempt property and owed $11,500 to various general creditors. $9,363 of the $11,500 was owed to a bank which employed Ms.
Keckler until she embezzled that amount. 54
Keckler did not view as relevant to the good faith issue either the
amount of payment to unsecured creditors or the existence of claims
dischargeable in Chapter 13 but not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 case.
In re Terry is in accord. 55 There are, however, cases to the contrary.
49. On April 23, 1980, a bankruptcy judge in Kansas issued an opinion that suggests a somewhat different approach to§ 1325(a)(4). In In re McMinn, I COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d 1007 (D.
Kan. 1980), Judge Pusateri looked to not only what a creditor would receive from the distribution
of the § 541 property of the estate in a Chapter 7 proceeding but also to what the creditor with a
claim excepted from discharge could recover from the debtor individually after a Chapter 7 proceeding had terminated. He refused to confirm a Chapter 13 plan that provided for a payment of
$440 to a creditor with a $44,000 claim that would be excepted from discharge in Chapter 7.
50. Eg., In re Beaver, 2 Bankr. Rep. 337 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Marlow, I COLLIER BANKR.
CAS. 2d 705 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1978).
52. "The Court shall confirm a plan if satisfied that ... (4) the proposal and its acceptance
are in good faith . . . . " Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 656 (repealed 1978, previously codified at 11
U.S.C. § 1056).
53. (1980] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 67,367 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1978) excepts from discharge any debt "for fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." Id.
55. I COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 525 (W.D. Ark. 1980). See a/so In re Cloutier, I COLLIER
BANKR. CAs. 2d 909 (D. Colo. 1980).
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In In re Beaver, 56 an unemployed cashier with two children,
$3,206 of debts, $955 of exempt property and monthly unemployment
compensation of $580 filed for relief under Chapter 13, formulating a
plan under which her creditors would receive 1% of their claims. The
court found:
[T]he debtor is proposing a repayment to her creditors which
amounts to as much as they would receive in a liquidation case . . . .
It is also the best effort that could be expected of someone in Ms.
Beaver's circumstances to undertake. On the other hand, the repayment to creditors is only one percent and cannot be held to constitute
a meaningful attempt to repay or "adjust" the debts involved. 57

The court refused to confirm the plan as it was not offered in "good
faith."
The Beaver opinion defines "good faith" as follows: "[A] proper
Chapter 13 plan must be a meaningful attempt to come to terms with
creditors. In this context the requirement of good faith is one meaning
more than just simple honesty. Instead, it requires a fundamental fair·
ness in dealing with one's creditors." 58
In re Marlow 59 has a similar holding and similar language defining
"good faith" under section 1325(a)(3). The court sustained a section
1325(a)(3) objection to confirmation of a plan providing for payment of
l % to a general claim holder who made a loan based on a false
financial statement. The court stated, "The element of good faith requires the debtor, at the very least, to make meaningful payments to
holders of unsecured claims. Otherwise, a Chapter 13 case may be construed as nothing more, in substance, than a Chapter 7 case, but without the disadvantage of certain provisions applicable in Chapter 7
cases." 60

Other reported Chapter 13 cases refusing to confirm no payment
or nominal payment plans use the phrase "meaningful payment."
What is a "meaningful payment"? Is there any statutory basis for de.ciding what amount is "meaningful"? Is there any practical way of
determining what amount is "meaningful"?
Two reported cases have addressed these questions. Dictum in In
re Curtis61 establishes a "rule of thumb" for determining whether the
payments proposed are in good faith: "in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, a debtor demonstrates his good faith by proposing to
pay at least 10% of his take-home pay over the three-year period ordi56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

2 Bankr. Rep. 337 (S.D. Cal. 1980).
Id. at 341 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 340.
I COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 705 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
Id. at 708.
2 Bankr. Rep. 43 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
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narily allowed as the maximum duration for chapter 13 plans." 62 The
court in Curtis found exceptional circumstances and confirmed a plan
providing payments of $75 a month for 18 months.
The Curtis opinion does not discuss whether a statutory basis exists for its "ten per cent of take-home pay rule of thumb." In re Burre!/63 does discuss the statutory grounds for the 70% payment rule it
established.
In re Burrell denied confirmation of a plan P.roviding payment of
fifteen cents on the dollar to each holder of an unsecured claim. The.
court found the plan "proposes to pay holders of unsecured claims 'not
less than the amount that would be paid on such claims if the estate of
the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7' " and "represents the
debtor's best effort." 64 Confirmation of the plan was nevertheless de-.
nied because "the proposed payment to unsecured creditors is not sub:..
stantial; which means that at least 70% of the allowed unsecured claims_
would be paid." 65
The' Burrell opinion expressly acknowledges the absence of statu-::
tory language requiring 70% payments in Chapter 13 plans and the fac~
it reads this requirement into section 1325. Burrell takes the positio~,
that the benefits of Chapter 13-no requirement of creditor approval,
inapplicability of section 523 exceptions to discharge-are so great.
Congress must have intended such benefits be available only to Chapter 13 debtors who make substantial payments to their creditors.
Burrell derives its 70% requirement from section 727(a)(9). That
section sets out the effect of a discharge in a prior Chapter 13 proceeding on a discharge in a Chapter 7 case. If a debtor who has filed for
relief under Chapter 7 received a discharge in an earlier Chapter 13
proceeding, he or she will be denied a discharge in the Chapter 7 pro~
ceeding unless the payments under the prior Chapter 13 plan totalled at
least 70% of the allowed unsecured claims.
Sectfon 727(a)(9) clearly contemplates that some Chapter 13 debtors will receive a discharge even though they paid general creditors less
than 70% of their claim. Burrell clearly contemplates that all Chapter
13 plans will propose at least 70% payments. Under Burrell, section
727(a)(9)'s 70% requirement would be triggered only by the following
specific fact situation: Debtor files a Chapter 13 petition and a Chapter
13 plan that proposes to pay Debtor's general creditors at least 70% of
their claims. Debtor is unable to satisfy the_ obligations imposed by the
plan but, nevertheless, receives a section 1328(b) "hardship" discharge.
62. Id. at 45. Cf. In re Crockett, (1980] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 67,406 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(confirming a Chapter 13 plan providing for 10% payment on general claims).
63. 2 Bankr. Rep. 650 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
64. Id. at 651.
65. Id.
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Debtor later files a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under Burrell, section 727(a)(9)'s 70% requirement
would be surplusage as to debtors who completed payments under their
Chapter 13 plans and received a section 1328(a) discharge.
This brief review of the cases imposing a "meaningful" or "substantial" payment requirement as a condition of confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan points up the two major problems with such judicial
action. First, there is no statutory basis for such a requirement. Nothing in the new Bankruptcy Code directly states or even indirectly suggests a debtor must propose to make "meaningful" or "substantial"
payments in his or her Chapter 13 plan. Indeed, section 1325(a)(4)
seems to suggest the contrary. That subsection expressly 9eals with the
question of how much a debtor must propose to pay his or her creditors
.in a Chapter 13 plan-not less than such creditors would receive in a
Chapter 7 proceeding. Second, any attempt by a court.to add a requirement of "meaningful" or "substantial" payments raises the obvious practical question of what amount is required. Why is 70%
"substantial" when 69% payments would not be? Why are 10% payments adequate in Missouri but not in the Northern District of California?
It is easy for a law teacher to suggest to lawyers and law students
that Chapter 13 permits a debtor in a "no asset" case to file a plan
providing no payment or nominal payment on unsecured claims. It is
not so easy for an attorney or a law student to suggest such action to a
client. Professor Countryman recently pointed out a possible risk inherent in such action-no discharge. Chapter 13 discharge releases the
debtor only from debts "provided for by the plan." 66 Is a debt "provided for by the plan" if the plan provides no payment or payment of
1% on the debt? 67
Professor Neustadler suggested a second risk of no payment or
nominal payment plans-conversion to Chapter 7. 68
B.

Class!fication Of General Claims

In proceedings under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
questions of how the debtor classified his or her general creditors never
arose. Section 646 required every Chapter XIII plan to include provisions "dealing with unsecured debts generally, upon any terms." 69 The
word "generally" was read as requiring equal treatment of general
66. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1978).
67. Countryman, Letter to the Editor, 85 CoM. L.J. 28 (1980).
68. Neustadter, Consumer Insolvency Counseling for Californians in the 1980's, 19 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 817, 912 (1979).
69. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 646(1) (repealed 1978, previously codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1046(1)).
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claims and payment of the same percentage of the debt on all unsecured debts. 70 A Chapter XIII plan cannot classify unsecured claims
and provide different treatment to different classes. A Chapter 13 plan
can.
Section l322(b)(l) expressly authorizes a debtor to classify unsecured claims in his or her Chapter 13 plan. This power to classify is
subject to two statutory limitations.
First, section 1322(b)(l) expressly refers to section 1122: "designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in section
1122." 71 Legislative history indicates any classification of claims in a
Chapter 13 plan is "subject to" the provisions of section 1122. 72
Section ·1122 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a plan may
place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or
interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such
class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting only
of every unsecured claim that is less than or reduced to an amount
that the court aporoves as reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience.73

Note that section l 122(a) merely requires every claim in a particular class be "substantially similar." It does not expressly require every
"substantially similar" claim to be in the same class. 74 If some general
claims are "Type A" and some general claims are "Type B," section
l 129(a) prohibits putting both "Type A" claims and "Type B" claims
in the same class. It does not, however, seem to require all "Type A"
claims be placed in the same class.
From the language of section l 129(a), apparently even if all the
debtor's unsecured debts were "substantially similar" he or she could
still classify claims. However, from the language of section l322(b), a
Chapter 13 debtor with ten "substantially similar debts" seemingly cannot divide his or her debts into classes. The second limitation on a
classification of claims in section 1322(b)(l) is that the plan may not
"discriminate unfairly against any class so designated."
Every classification discriminates. Which classifications discriminate "unfairly"? The "discriminates unfairly" test is unique to Chapter
13 of the new Bankruptcy Code. There was no counterpart in the
70. See 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 28.02, at 272-73 (14th ed. 1976).
71. 11U.S.C.§1322(b)(I) (emphasis added).
72. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118, reprinted in (1978] U.S. CooE CoNG. & Ao.
NEWS 5787; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406, reprinted in (1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
Ao. NEWS 5963.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1978).
74. See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 24, ~ 1122.03, at 1122-4, cited with
approval in In re Gay, I COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d 790, 791-92 (D. Colo. 1980).
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Bankruptcy Act of 1898; there is no corresponding provision in Chapter 11 of the new Bankruptcy Code.
Judge Creahan of New York, 75 Judge Sidman of Ohio, 76 and
Judge Mabey of Utah77 have relied on the "discriminates unfairly" language to require all similar claims in a Chapter 13 plan be in the same
class. For example, in In re McKenzie, 78 Judge Creahan refused to
confirm a Chapter 13 plan providing full payment to holders of unsecured claims on which there was a codebtor and payment of 50% to
all other holders of unsecured claims. In so ruling, Judge Creahan
stated: "It is difficult to imagine any classificatio)f of unsecured creditors which would not discriminate against some class in one manner or
another. Classification in itself would seem to denote discrimination. . . . Here, all unsecured creditors have the same rights vis-a-vis
estate property . . . . "79
If, as Judge Creahan suggests in McKenzie, all cre~itors having the
same rights vis-a-vis estate property must be in the same class, all holders of general claims must be in the same class. Judge Lee of Kentucky
made a somewhat similar suggestion in a recent law review article.
The Code permits unsecured debts to be placed in a separate class on
the basis of amount in order that small claims may be paid expeditiously for administrative convenience. [(Section l 122(b))] It also
permits unsecured claims on which the last payment is due after the
date on which the final payment under the plan is due to be dealt
with separately. [(Section 1322(b)(5))] There is no authorization for
further classification of unsecured debts. 80

There are, however, reported cases authorizing "further classification of unsecured debts." In re Curtis 81 confirmed a Chapter 13 plan
dividing unsecured claims into two classes: class #1 for child support
payments and class #2 for all other unsecured claims. Under the plan,
class # 1 was to be paid 100% and class #2 was to be paid 10%. In
formulating the plan, the debtor was obviously influenced by section
523(a)(5) which excepts child support claims from the operation of a
discharge. In approving the plan, the bankruptcy court was similarly
influenced:
[l]t appears that there is a rational basis for the discrimination between the two classes and that it must therefore be regarded as "fair"
within the meaning of the above section. [section 1322(b)(l)] For
the obvious import of the nondischargeability section is that child
75. In re McKenzie, I COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 599 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
76. In re Blevins, I Bankr. Rep. 442 (S.D. Ohio 1979); In re Fizer, I Bankr. Rep. 400 (S.D.
Ohio 1979).
77. In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. Rep. 256, 260 (D. Utah 1980).
78. I COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d 599 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
79. Id. at 603. See In re Utter, I COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d 930 (W.D.N.Y. 1980)
(§ 1322(b)( I) prohibits the separate classification of codebtor claims); In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr.
Rep. 256 (D. Utah 1980) (same).
80. Lee, Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303, 313 (1979).
81. I COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 314 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
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support payments are generally to be regarded as having a status
higher than the ordinary indebtedness under the law of bankruptcy.82
Notwithstanding that Curtis describes child support claims as
"generally regarded as having a status higher than ordinary indebtedness under the law of bankruptcy," a child support claimant has the
"same rights vis-a-vis estate property" as other creditors. The holding
in Curtis is inconsistent with the dictum in McKenzie.
The holding and the dictum in In re Sutherland 83 is consistent
with Curtis. In re Sutherland confirmed a Chapter 13 plan with four
classes of general claims:
( 1) medical bills;
(2) bank credit;
(3) accounts from creditors that debtor intends to continue doing
business with; and
(4) all creditors.
All of the claims had the "same rights vis-a-vis estate property." While
none of the claims were excepted from discharge, the classification was
nevertheless approved.
Sutherland rejects a "rationality of the classification test" as improper judicial legislating. Instead,
The question under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(l) is not "rationality" of the
classifications. The question is whether there is "unfairness" between the classes. When a creditor or a class of creditors are not
legally entitled to receive anything, they cannot be classified in an
unfairly discriminatory manner. If a plan proposes to pay each unsecured claim at least as much as that claim would receive in liquidation under Chapter 7, the plan can propose to pay additional sums to
a single unsecured creditor or classes of other unsecured creditors
without unfairly discriminating. The debtors are paying more than is
legally required and the Courts should not discourage such plans.
Under circumstances where the debtors do not have to pay anything to any unsecured creditors, it makes no sense to have a system
that prevents them from paying one or more unsecured creditors of
their choosing. Surely the Bankruptcy Courts should not be in a position of telling debtors that they cannot voluntarily pay a creditor
from groperty or future income in which other creditors have no
right.
The Sutherland opinion seems to be an example of judicial legislating. The court is not adding to legislation; it is in effect taking away
from legislation. Under the language of Sutherland, any Chapter 13
plan meeting the requirement of section 1325(a)(4) also meets the re- ·
82. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
83. 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1980).
84. Id. at 14. Note § 524 places bankruptcy courts in the position of telling debtors they
cannot voluntarily make a binding obligation to pay a creditor from future property or from
future income in which other creditors have no rights. See In re Woodford, I COLLIER BANKR.
CAs. 2d 789 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
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quirement of section 1322(b)(l). 85
As Sutherland illustrates, the resolution of the question of permissible classification of claims under section 1322(b)(l) is closely tied to
the resolution of the question of the amount of payment legally required by section 1325(a)(4). 86 The question of classification of claims
in Chapter 13 plans should not, however, be tied to the question of
classification of claims in Chapter 11. The differences between Chapter
11 and Chapter 13 call for different policies on claim classification. 87
In Chapter 11, creditors vote on plans by classes. A plan cannot be
confirmed unless at least one class of claims has accepted the plan. 88
This requirement of Chapter 11 could easily be circumvented if Chapter 11 debtors were given a free hand in classifying claims. Chapter 13
has no corresponding requirement, thus, classification in Chapter 13
does not present the same problem.
Classification of claims in Chapter 13 presents problems of interpreting cryptic statutory language and balancing competing policy considerations. The cases have identified the critical statutory language"as provided in section 1122" and "discriminate unfairly," and the critical policy considerations-treating similar creditors similarly and encouraging the debtor to pay as much as possible to creditors.
III.

ADVANTAGES OF CHAPTER

13

Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the legal issues discussed
in Part II of this Article, Chapter 13 offers a number of advantages to
the debtor seeking bankruptcy relief.
A debtor considering filing for relief under Chapter 7 who is eligible for Chapter 13 would realize the following benefits from filing
under Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7:
( 1) a more comprehensive stay:
The automatic stay of section 362 protects both Chapter 7 debtors
and Chapter 13 debtors from formal and informal collection efforts. In
Chapter 13, section 1301 also protects codebtors. Chapter 7 has no corresponding protection.
(2) retention of property:
In Chapter 7, "property of the estate" as described in section 541 is
distributed to creditors. In Chapter 13, the debtor keeps ."property of
85. Sutherland involves a plan that proposed to pay certain classes of creditors more than
others. Perhaps the court would find plans proposing to pay certain classes of creditors before
others "discriminates unfairly." See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 24, ~ 1322.01, at
1322-7.
86. See also In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr. Rep. 256, 261 (D. Utah 1980).
87. For a general discussion of Chapter 11, see D. EPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 279-302.
88. II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(IO) (1978).
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the estate," except as provided in the plan or in the order of confirmation.
(3) availability of discharge:
A Chapter 7 will be barred from discharge if a party in interest
establishes any of the ten objections to discharge listed in section 727.
Section 727 does not apply in Chapter 13.
(4) debts discharged:
Section 523 excepts nine classes of claims from the operation of a
bankruptcy discharge. All nine exceptions apply to a Chapter 7 debtor.
Only the exception for alimony and child support applies to a debtor
who has filed for relief under Chapter 13 and completed his or her
obligations under the Chapter 13 plan.
(5) effect on future Chaper 7 relief:
A debtor who receives a Chapter 7 discharge may not obtain a
discharge in another Chapter 7 case for six years. A Chapter 13 discharge does not affect the availability of future Chapter 7 relief if the
Chapter 13 plan was the debtor's best effort and paid at least 70% of the
general claims. Neither a Chapter 7 discharge nor a Chapter 13 discharge affects the availability of future Chapter 13 relief.
(6) tax relief:
Neither Chapter 7 nor Chapter 13 provides an escape from most
tax liability. Chapter 13 does, however, provide greater relief. Since
most tax claims are excepted from discharge, a debtor who has filed for
Chapter 7 relief and received a discharge faces immediate liability for
all unsatisfied tax claims. In Chapter 13, the debtor can spread out his
tax payments over the life of the plan.
(7) cure defaults:
In his or her Chapter 13 plan, a debtor can provide for the curing
of any defaults on secured or unsecured claims. 89 Assume, for example, that JJ makes house payments of $360 a month. J) misses two
payments. J) then files for relief under Chapter 13. D's Chapter 13
plan can cure that default created by the two missed $360 payments by
providing in the plan for house payments of $380 for the 36 months of
the plan.
If JJ files instead under Chapter 7, J) would not have 36 months to
cure her default. Rather, the mortgagor could foreclose after the Chapter 7 proceeding was dismissed if JJ did not immediately make up the
$720 delinquency.
(8) discharge liens:
Section 722 empowers a Chapter 7 debtor to extinguish otherwise
valid liens by paying the lienor the value of its collateral. Chas a se89. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3), (5) (1978).
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curity interest on D's 1978 Chrysler to secure its $4,000. If the Chrysler
is only worth $1,800, D can extinguish C's lien by paying C $1,800.
Section 722 seems to contemplate cash payment. 90 As discussed above,
a Chapter 13 debtor could discharge C's lien by making payments that
have a present value of$1,800 over the period of the Chapter 13 plan. 91
A business debtor who is eligible for Chapter 13 shoud carefully
consider Chapter 13 before filing a Chapter 11 petition. Chapter 13 has
the following advantages over Chapter 11:
(1) Codebtors are protected by Section 1301.
(2) A debtor desiring to continue operating his or her business is
less likely to be displaced in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 11.
(3) Only the debtor may file a Chapter 13 plan.
(4) Chapter 13 makes no provision for creditors' committees.
(5) Chapter 13 does not require creditor acceptance of a plan of
rehabilitation.

90. Section 524(c)(4) suggests that installment payments under § 722 require the creditor's
agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4) (1978).
91. For a discussion of§ 1325, see text and notes accompanying section E supra.

